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Abstract
France has never had as many doctors as today. 
However, the French healthcare system is 
characterized by a very unequal distribution of 
healthcare provision, so that access to medical 
care becomes more difficult for growing sections 
of the population. This situation is all the more 
surprising given that, since the 1970s, the French 
state has equipped itself with instruments supposed 
to regulate the number of doctors practicing in 
France, both in terms of their overall workforce and 
their distribution between disciplines. In addition, 
since the 2000s, the public authorities have stepped 
up measures to encourage a better geographical 
distribution of doctors. To understand the failure 
of these measures, this article examines the social 
and political logics that have been predominant 
in their adoption and implementation. Based 
mainly on administrative records, it describes how 
the French state, in close relationship with the 
medical profession, defined the problem of medical 
demography from the early 1960s onwards, and 
what successive responses it has given it without 
succeeding in solving it.
Keywords :  Medical Demography; Doctors; 
Healthcare Inequalities; State; Public Policy.
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Introduction
By 2015, France had almost 217,000 doctors. 
Not only has the number of practicing doctors in 
France never been so high, but also the medical 
density itself has never been greater. Also in 
2015, there were only 338 doctors per 100,000 
inhabitants, compared with 329 in 2000 and 194 
in 1980. However, these data conceal significant 
disparities and contrasting developments 
according to the modalities and areas of practice 
of physicians. Since the mid-2000s, the number 
of general practitioners has stagnated, and 
even declined in many parts of the territory, 
while the population has continued to increase. 
In hospitals, thousands of job positions are not 
filled. These difficulties do not refer only to rural 
areas. In large cities, which concentrate a larger 
proportion of physicians, the time required to 
get a consultation with certain categories of 
specialists is increasingly long. This development, 
combined with the explosion of the number of 
fees charged by the liberal medical practitioners, 
causes patients to give up some types of care, or 
leave them for later.
However, since the early 1970s and 1980s, 
the French state has developed instruments to 
regulate the number of doctors working in the 
country, both in terms of its general workforce 
and its distribution between disciplines (general 
medicine and specialties). Moreover, since the early 
2000s, governments have multiplied measures 
to promote better geographical distribution of 
physicians. Nevertheless, none of these measures 
provided a satisfactory answer to the problem of 
unequal distribution of medical care. In order to 
understand this failure in relation to the declared 
objectives of these measures, it is necessary to 
reconstruct the prevailing social and political 
logics in their adoption and implementation. 
To do this, I conducted a historical survey of 
how the “problem” of medical demography in 
France has been settled since the early 1960s, 
and how the French state, in close connection 
with certain segments of the medical community, 
has intervened in this area. This research, which 
is mainly based on administrative records and 
Résumé
La France n’a jamais autant compté de médecins 
qu’aujourd’hui. Pourtant, le système de santé 
français se caractérise par une répartition très 
inégale de l’offre de soins, si bien que l’accès 
aux soins médicaux devient plus difficile pour 
des fractions croissantes de la population. Cette 
situation apparaît d’autant plus surprenante qu’à 
partir des années 1970, quand l’État français s’est 
doté d’instruments supposés réguler le nombre de 
médecins exerçant en France, tant au niveau de 
leur effectif global que de leur répartition entre 
disciplines. En outre, à partir des années 2000, les 
pouvoirs publics ont multiplié les mesures visant à 
favoriser une meilleure répartition géographique 
des médecins. Pour comprendre l’échec de ces 
mesures, cet article étudie les logiques sociales 
et politiques qui ont été prédominantes dans 
leur adoption et leur mise en œuvre. S’appuyant 
principalement sur des archives administratives, 
il décrit comment l’État français, en relation 
étroite avec le corps médical, a défini le problème 
de la démographie médicale à partir du début des 
années 1960, et quelles réponses successives il lui 
a apportées sans parvenir à le résoudre.
Mots-clés : Démographie Médicale; Médecins; 
Inégalités d’Accès aux Soins; Etat; Action Publique.
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other documentary sources,1 showed that the 
issue of medical demography has been the subject 
of recurring struggles not only in the medical 
community but also within the state. For various 
reasons, related mainly to the position they occupy 
within the medical field, physicians have been 
often divided over this subject. These debates have 
also occurred at the administrative and political 
levels, and medical demographics have drawn the 
attention of ministerial departments with divergent 
concerns and interests. Thus the way governments 
have addressed the issue of medical demography 
has been the result of numerous compromises 
between these actors. In the decisions made on 
the subject, the medical needs of the population 
have always been strategically defined and 
mobilized, and the consideration of these needs 
has always been subordinated to the interests of 
the parties involved.
In doing so, this research aimed not only to 
illuminate the tensions that currently cross the 
French healthcare system, but also to show the 
limits of certain studies carried out in the sociology 
of the professions on the so-called processes of 
“professional closure”, that is, on the strategies 
and mechanisms that limit access to a particular 
profession and reduce competition among its 
members. This body of research, inspired by 
Weberian sociology on “closed economic groups” 
(Weber, 1995), often grants excessive unity to 
professional groups and underestimates the 
importance of specific logics of the political and 
administrative field (Le Bianic, 2008). We will return 
to this issue to conclude.
This article follows a chronological order. As a 
first step, I will concentrate on the genesis of the 
numerus clausus of medicine, which is the oldest 
and most important instrument ever created to 
regulate the medical workforce in France. So I will 
show how the numerus clausus was supplemented by 
other quotas, on access to specialized training and 
1 I refer here to my book for a detailed list of sources (Déplaude, 2015). This article is a very concise presentation of the contents of 
this book.
2  Physicians under contract with the French Social Security agreed to respect the rates set by it, in exchange for having about 80% of the 
expenses incurred by patients (fees and revenues) reimbursed. The generalization of contract medicine resulted in making independent 
practitioners accessible to the majority of the population and thus encouraging a rapid increase in demand for care.
trained doctors from countries outside the European 
Union. Next, I will analyze how all these quotas were 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, in a logic 
mainly focused on controlling the costs of health 
insurance, preserving the economic interests of 
independent doctors (médecins libéraux in French). 
As a final step, I will describe the difficulties that 
this policy entailed and the changes it underwent 
in the 2000s, even though the difficulties related to 
the inequal distribution of care provision have not 
been resolved yet.
Instituting the numerus clausus of 
medicine
Until 1971, future physicians were selected by 
exams, as in other university courses. On the one 
hand, the cost and length of medical education, 
and the economic risks associated with the private 
practice of medicine on the other, at a time when the 
salaried positions of professionals were still rare, 
both have had the effect of limiting the number of 
candidates. In the 1950s, the number of medical 
students stagnated, while the total number of 
students enrolled in French universities increased 
by more than 40%. Just over 2,000 state doctor 
degrees were issued each year.
However, in 1960, the number of medical 
students increased sharply: from 31,500 in 1960 
to 54,700 in 1966, a growth of 74% in six years. 
Although this phenomenon was found in other 
academic disciplines and has been favored by very 
general factors, such as the increase in the number 
of university students and the mitigation of class 
and sex social discrimination in higher education, 
it was also due to specific factors. On the one hand, 
the generalization of contract medicine (médecine 
conventionnée) after the promulgation of the “Bacon 
Decree” of May 12, 1960, made the independent 
practice of medicine economically safer (Hatzfeld, 
1963).2 On the other hand, the 1960s were marked 
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by an unprecedented expansion of hospitals and 
important therapeutic and technical advances that 
enhanced the prestige of the medical profession. 
This was favored by the state, including the adoption 
of the so-called “Debré” reforms of 1958, which 
created “hospital and university centers” (CHUs), 
and hospital financing that encouraged their 
development (Chevandier, 2009, Jamous 1969). 
Correspondingly, many salaried medical positions 
were created in hospitals, including the most coveted 
ones, the “medical teachers”, who combined salaries 
from the university and from the hospital.
In the beginning, the increase in the number of 
medical students was not seen as a problem: both 
at the state level and at the medical community, 
the idea that many doctors needed to be trained 
was widely shared – the French healthcare system 
was even considered to lay behind those of other 
industrialized countries. This was true for doctors in 
hospitals and universities, for whom training more 
doctors was crucial for the development of CHUs, 
and for an organization such as the Confederation 
of French Medical Unions (CSMF, Confédération 
des syndicats médicaux français), then dominant 
among independent doctors: for it, it was a matter of 
answering the problem of the “excessive workload” 
of independent doctors (and especially of general 
practitioners) in the face of very rapid growth in 
the demand for care. For the CSMF, an excessive 
workload would certainly result in higher incomes, 
but also in a deterioration in the conditions of 
practice, at the risk of making the medical profession 
less attractive to students.
The social and political crisis of May-June 1968, 
marked by major student mobilizations and strikes 
in virtually all sectors of the French economy and 
administration, changed the game. This crisis 
spared neither hospitals nor medical schools, 
where strikes took place, occupations and many 
scenes that symbolically reversed the very marked 
hierarchies of the teaching hospitals. Some doctors 
from teaching hospitals, especially the Parisians, 
came together to claim a “selection” in admission 
to medical schools. In fact, they feared that the 
rapid increase in the number of students would 
result in a lasting depreciation of the practice 
of medicine. They received the support of the 
French Order of Physicians (Conseil national de 
l’Ordre des médecins) and of the most conservative 
organizations of independent medicine, such as the 
Federation of Physicians of France (Fédération des 
médecins de France), which claimed total freedom 
in fixing the medical fees (Déplaude, 2009a, 2009c). 
They also received significant state-level support 
from the Ministry of Budget, concerned about the 
rapid increase in health spending, which went 
from 3.5% to 5% of the Gross Domestic Product 
between 1960 and 1970 (Caussat, Fenina; Geoffroy, 
2003). For this ministry, it was essential to control 
the number of physicians in order to control the 
development of public health spending over the 
long term. Indeed, in France, all individuals who 
hold a state diploma in medicine and are registered 
by the Order of Physicians (which is, for holders of 
a state diploma, a mere formality) may request to 
contract with the French Social Security. The latter 
cannot refuse it, regardless of where physicians 
decide to settle and the specialty they choose to 
pursue. Due to the almost automatic agreement 
of the independent doctors by the Social Security, 
the graduation of a greater number of practitioners 
was therefore likely to result in additional costs 
for public health insurance.
To justify the introduction of an entrance exam 
at the beginning of medical studies, advocates of the 
“selection” used a powerful argument: that it was 
necessary to ensure the quality practical training for 
future physicians. In fact, until 1968, students did 
not receive the same clinical training: the “externs”, 
who were selected through exams organized by 
hospitals from their second year of medical studies, 
received a much more intensive practical training 
than the other students, who were not as well thought 
of by hospital doctors. However, in response to a 
demand expressed by medical students mobilized 
in May 1968, the government removed the exams 
that selected externs, so that all students received 
the same practical training. Thus, the problem 
was to assign hospital functions to all students, 
in a context in which many hospitals were under 
construction or renovation. The main argument of 
selection advocates was therefore that the number 
of medical students should be proportional to the 
training capacities of hospitals.
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Despite the reluctance of some government 
officials, who feared a new “May 1968” more 
than anything else, a law established in 1971 a 
“limitation” to the number of students received in 
the second year of medical education, according 
to the training capacity of hospitals. The French 
government, which was careful and concerned not 
to be accused of Malthusianism, chose to stabilize 
the number of students received from the first year 
of medical studies, without reduction. In 1979, 
the principle of entrance exam was no longer 
disputed, and the government introduced a new 
criterion in determining the numerus clausus: “the 
population’s health needs”. In fact, no one knew how 
to determine such needs and deduce the number 
of doctors in training. However, this notion was 
a convenient fiction that allowed governments to 
more freely determine the numerus clausus – and 
especially to reduce it – without being linked to the 
evaluation of the training capacity of hospitals, 
which was made by teaching hospital physicians 
(Déplaude, 2009b).
A system of quotas
Debates over medical demography after the 
events of May-June 1968 were not only about the 
number of students to be admitted to the second 
year of medical studies but also about access to 
specialized training. In fact, a growing proportion 
of medical students chose to study in a specialty 
(ophthalmology, cardiology, pediatrics, dermatology, 
etc.) and moved away from general medicine. In fact, 
with the exception of surgery, it was possible to 
graduate in a specialty without having passed the 
“residence” entrance exam (concours de l’internat), 
organized by hospitals from the fourth year of 
studies, providing access to remuneration and 
hospital responsibilities.3 Since 1947, governments 
authorized the creation of “certificates of special 
studies” (certificats d’études spéciales) issued by 
medical schools. Less prestigious and selective 
than the “royal” CHU residency, they did not provide 
access to hospital and academic careers, but they 
3  The most selective and sought after residence entrance exams were those organized by the CHUs – and particularly those from Paris. 
In the 1960s, only 15% of medical students achieved the CHU residence (Laugier; Gout, 1962).
allowed the establishment as a specialist in the 
private sector. These courses were very popular 
among students, half of whom enrolled after earning 
their doctorate in medicine in the mid-1970s.
This trend was denounced by the unions 
of independent doctors, that feared that the 
development of specialized medicine would reduce 
the scope of general practitioners’ practice and 
devalue their profession. The shortage of vacancies 
opened in hospitals also meant that a growing share 
of former CHU residents practiced in the private 
sector where they faced competition from specialized 
doctors issued from courses that were considered as 
less selective and less formative. The government, 
in turn, sought to curb the development of 
specialized medicine, which was considered more 
expensive for the public health insurance than 
general medicine. In addition, it had to comply with 
European directives (adopted in 1975) on the training 
of physicians, which provided that all students 
wishing to graduate in a specialty would hold 
hospital responsibilities. At the end of discussions 
and negotiations that spanned more than fifteen 
years, access to specialized training was limited 
by a reform of medical studies in 1982: from that 
moment on, only the ones approved in the residence 
entrance exam could graduate in a specialty. CHU 
physicians required that future specialists be 
trained primarily in their services, to the detriment 
of non-university hospitals that employed many 
students preparing for a certificate of special 
studies. In addition to improving the training of 
specialists, one of the main goals of the reform 
was to reduce the number of trained specialists by 
reducing the proportion of students training in a 
specialty to one-third. However, contrary to their 
original intent, governments have not succeeded in 
imposing quotas by specialty, except for psychiatry, 
biology and public health, which represented only 
a small proportion of trained specialists. Medical 
students and doctors at university hospitals actually 
succeeded in ensuring that the medical residency 
established by the 1982 reform remained as close 
as possible to the former residence of university 
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hospitals, liberal and elitist; the students wanted to 
keep the choice of specialization as free as possible, 
and the doctors wanted to continue to be able to 
recruit residents based on the needs of their services 
in any particular specialty.
Finally, the institution of quotas restricting 
access to the second year of medical school (the 
numerus clausus itself) and then those regulating 
the access to specialized training (the new residence 
entrance exam) were accompanied by measures 
aimed at regulating the installation in France of 
doctors trained abroad. Since 1892, it was necessary 
to hold the state diploma of doctor of medicine to 
practice in France. In 1933, as a result of xenophobic 
mobilizations, a law also introduced a condition 
of French citizenship (Evleth, 1995). Given these 
draconian conditions, very few professionals trained 
abroad had the right to work in France. However, in 
1972, a law authorized the issuance of work permits 
for doctors who did not meet these conditions, 
subject to an assessment of their diplomas and 
their careers by a specialized committee. The first 
“work licenses” issued mainly benefitted doctors 
who had emigrated to France for political reasons. 
However, members of the Commission, composed 
of representatives of the medical community and 
the state, very quickly came to the agreement that 
the number of work licenses issued per year should 
not exceed 1% of the numerus clausus, especially 
for fear of provoking xenophobic reactions among 
medical students (Déplaude, 2011).
Thus, in the early 1980s, a complete system of 
quotas linked to each other regulated the access to 
the practice of medicine in France. Thanks to these 
quotas, the public authorities theoretically had the 
power to determine the number of doctors who could 
practice in France and their distribution between 
general practice and specialties.
Rationing the number of doctors
Until the early 2000s, the determination of quotas 
that restricted access to the medical profession 
was the subject of recurring struggles, both within 
4  In 1980, the government allowed doctors to charge higher rates than those of the Social Security. Unlike specialists, very few general 
practitioners opted for this possibility, some out of conviction, others out of fear of losing patients.
the medical community and the state. It opposed 
mainly the unions of independent physicians to the 
representatives of medical teachers. From the mid-
1970s to the mid-1990s, the former were constantly 
calling for a reduction of the quotas – and, firstly, of 
the numerus clausus of medicine. In fact, the labor 
market in this period was marked by the flow of great 
promotions of doctors trained in the late 1960s: the 
number of physicians in practice rose from 81,000 in 
1975 to 173,000 in 1990. With the insufficient number 
of vacancies created for salaried doctors, the great 
majority of young doctors established themselves 
as independent professionals. The difficulties were 
concentrated in the general practitioners, more 
numerous, competing with medical specialists and 
generally applying, unlike the latter, Social Security 
fees:4 not only did the professionals settling in the 
1980s take longer than their predecessors to build 
their clientele, but they could not, even after several 
years, achieve a similar level of income (Beudaert, 
1999). Within unions of independent physicians, 
representatives of general practitioners also 
advocated for a drastic reduction in the number of 
physicians graduated in universities. Moreover, the 
fragmentation of unions of independent physicians, 
involved in fierce competition to represent the 
interests of independent physicians (Hassenteufel, 
1997), led them to radicalize their positions on 
the subject.
On the other hand, teaching doctors were 
concerned about the consequences of reducing the 
number of doctors in training on medical schools 
and especially on the operation of hospital services. 
Indeed, creations and renewals of vacancies for 
doctors in teaching hospitals partly depended on 
the number of students enrolled in medical schools: 
the reduction in their number – from 148,500 in 
1978 to 113,700 in 1988 – made it difficult to obtain 
these teaching positions. This was so worrying as 
the inequalities in staffing among institutions 
were glaring. But, above all, a numerus clausus 
could translate into a long-term decrease in the 
number of residents, i.e. the number of trained 
specialists in hospitals. Medical residents were 
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indispensable for the operation of many hospital 
services as they assumed a large part of shifts and 
took on numerous other tasks. In principle, the 
decrease in the number of residents should have 
been compensated with the creation of vacancies 
for hospital physicians, but the significantly 
higher cost of such positions and the difficulty in 
recruiting professionals who were willing to work 
in shifts have made the maintenance of a sufficient 
number of residents a major challenge for hospitals 
and universities. Consequently, although some of 
them supported the institution of the numerus 
clausus, from the 1980s they strongly opposed to 
a sharp decline in that number.
These internal struggles in the medical 
community were redoubled within the state by an 
opposition between two sets of administrations. 
On the one hand, public health insurance managers 
– who represented the administrations in charge of 
the state budget and of the Social Security – strove 
above all to contain the increase in public health 
expenses, which had become a major concern of the 
government in the 1970s (Pierru, 2007). For these 
high officials, medical demography represented an 
important issue for the control of health expenses, 
since they defended the idea that the existence 
of many physicians – and particularly specialists 
– generated an artificial demand for care and, 
thus, unnecessarily increased the costs of health 
insurance (Déplaude, 2010). In 1996, the Ministry 
of the Budget would still defend the idea that the 
numerus clausus should not only be a management 
tool (health expenditure control), but also a reform 
tool. According to this ministry, it was a matter 
of putting the healthcare system under pressure 
(possibly at the price of a shortage of professionals 
in some areas) to encourage doctors to accept, or 
even want, some unpopular measures: closure 
of hospital services, restrictions on freedom of 
installation of independent doctors etc. Becoming 
more efficient, the health system would allow the 
French to be cared as well as or better than before, 
with fewer doctors.
5 In addition, among general practitioners, many are turning to a specialized practice (Allergology, Sophrology, Acupuncture, Emergency 
Medicine, Occupational Medicine, School Medicine, etc.) without even having the specialist title after their studies. Today, among 
physicians licensed in general practice, one-third do not practice it specifically (ONDPS, 2008).
On the other hand, the Ministry of Education and 
then the Ministry of Health relayed the concerns of 
teaching doctors: they were mainly concerned with 
the consequences of reducing the number of doctors 
in training in hospital services. They were able, along 
with the teaching doctors, to make the numerus 
clausus be distributed over time; but they could 
not avoid a sharp decline in this quota, according 
to what unions of independent doctors and health 
insurance managers demanded: from 7,900 in 1979, 
the numerus clausus decreased to 3,500 in 1993, and 
it maintained that level until the end of the 1990s. 
The number of vacancies advertised in residence 
examinations decreased, however in a less marked 
way so as not to create too many difficulties for 
hospital services. It was reduced by about one-third, 
and as a result, the goal of reforming medical studies 
in 1982 – to train fewer specialists and more general 
practitioners – was not achieved. It was the opposite 
that happened: since 1998, France has trained more 
specialists than general practitioners.5
Ultimately, during the years 1980-1990, the 
quotas regulating access to the medical profession 
were not based on a rough estimate of the 
“health needs” of the population. The concern of 
governments to contain the increase in public health 
expenditure on the one hand and to minimize the 
consequences of reducing the number of doctors 
in training on the operation of hospital services 
represented much more decisive issues.
A still unequal healthcare system
The policy pursued by the government on the 
issue of medical demography between the late 
1970s and the late 1990s has had positive effects for 
many physicians, particularly independent doctors. 
The early career of young general practitioners is 
much less difficult today than it was in the early 
1980s. The sharp drop in the number of doctors 
trained at universities has also helped unions of 
independent practitioners to successfully defend 
the almost automatic contracting of professionals 
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by the Social Security, to which the health insurance 
managers have tried to put an end to. However, 
the reform of medical studies in 1982 and the 
adjustment of quotas were at the origin of significant 
difficulties for hospitals. Initially, these difficulties 
were concentrated at the level of non-university 
hospitals, which had lost many trained specialists 
for CHU’s benefit, and lacked doctors to ensure the 
operation of services. Faced with these difficulties, 
which have also affected the CHUs since the 1990s, 
hospitals have hired physicians trained outside the 
European Union: indeed, although not authorized to 
practice as independent physicians, these doctors 
could be employed in hospitals under special 
statutes, precarious and poorly paid. After initially 
facilitating recruitment, the French government 
tried to limit them, but in vain. Today, doctors with 
non-EU diplomas contribute to a very important part 
of the functioning of French hospitals; few of them 
work as independent practitioners.
However, in addition to the hospital sector, the 
predicted decrease in the number of physicians, due 
to the numerus clausus, have begun to worry the 
Order of Physicians and some unions of specialists 
in the 1990s. Far from being homogeneous, the 
decrease in the number of physicians would 
affect more particularly certain specialties and 
geographical areas in which physicians were already 
scarce. Fearing this prospect, likely to lead to a 
deterioration in the working conditions of many 
physicians and to increasing difficulties of access 
to care in certain parts of the territory, they called 
for more doctors to be trained, particularly in certain 
specialties. Some politicians, often based in rural 
areas, were also interested in the issue of medical 
demography and called for measures to enable 
doctors to establish themselves in their territories.
These claims, supported by the demographic 
projections of the Ministry of Health, have been 
widely disseminated since 2001. The government, 
which had begun to loosen the numerus clausus, 
6  One such measure would be, for example, to deny that doctors wishing to settle in areas already well-equipped with doctors can contract 
with the national Social Security.
7  Even without considering the Paris region (which represents an atypical case because of the size of Parisian hospitals), regional 
differences in medical density range from 1 to 1.4 for general practice and from 1 to 1.6 for specialties (Conseil National de l’Ordre des 
Médecins, 2016). The differences are even more striking at the subregional level.
increased it dramatically from that date – from 3,600 
in 1997 to 7,000 in 2006 –, and it stabilized at that 
level. Likewise, the number of residence vacancies 
offered has increased. To date, the increase in quotas 
has been the main response of the authorities to 
the problem of medical demography, as it has been 
redefined since the late 1990s. We can analyze this 
increase as a policy of “supply saturation”, which 
consists to train many physicians in the hope that 
a sufficient number of them will practice in less 
attractive places (Bourgueil, 2007).
However, the state has also taken many measures 
to encourage the installation of young graduates in 
areas with poor medical care. Contrary to what some 
actors wanted (politicians from rural areas, public 
health insurance managers and representatives 
of the hospital community), these measures did 
not limit the freedom of establishment of the 
independent physicians, making the Social Security 
agreement conditional on the choice of place 
of establishment, as it has been done in several 
paramedical professions since 2007.6 To date, no 
government has dared to confront the unions of 
independent doctors and, even more, the student 
and resident unions, questioning the doctors’ 
almost automatic agreement by the Social Security. 
The measures adopted by the public authorities 
have exclusively consisted of positive incentives, 
mainly financial, for the establishment in areas 
lacking physicians (material aid for establishment, 
increased fees for the practice in needy areas, 
“public service commitment contracts”, “territory’s 
general practitioners’” provisions). Despite their 
cost to public finances, these measures have had 
very weak effects so far. In addition, they have 
been focused on general practitioners, while liberal 
specialists are distributed even more unevenly in the 
territory.7 The maintenance of the almost automatic 
agreement of the independent doctors by the Social 
Security and, therefore, the weak regulation of the 
establishment of professionals in the independent 
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sector, have had two important consequences. 
First, they encourage the perpetuation of a very 
unequal geographical distribution of physicians 
in the territory, both among general practitioners 
and among specialists. They also contribute to 
hospital recruitment difficulties, since many young 
specialists, considering hospital care insufficiently 
attractive, prefer to establish themselves as 
independent professionals, with predominantly 
higher fees than those of the Social Security.8
Although the doctors’ tendency to establish 
themselves preferentially in large cities where 
there are more economic opportunities, and where 
professional communities are the most developed, 
is not a new phenomenon (Tonnelier, 1992), it is 
reinforced today by two simultaneous changes. On 
the one hand, most doctors’ spouses today have a 
professional activity and most often hold highly 
qualified positions. This requires finding a place of 
exercise that allows the spouse to find a satisfactory 
job, which favors the establishment in large cities, 
where employment opportunities with a high level 
of qualification are the highest. On the other hand, 
the fact that physicians most often have an active 
spouse has led an increasing number of them to find 
an activity mode compatible with some investment 
in the domestic sphere: the “permanent availability” 
model, characterized by a strong amplitude of hours 
of work, is declining even among men (Lapeyre, Le 
Feuvre, 2005). However, the practice of medicine 
in areas with few physicians continues to present 
stronger constraints, particularly from the point 
of view of working time, the volume of shifts to 
take on and greater challenges for the physician 
replacement. As a consequence, candidates for 
these regions are rare, and many retiring doctors 
are not replaced.
Final considerations
Contrary to analyses that are still common in the 
sociology of professions and studies devoted to the 
history of the medical profession, our study shows that 
French physicians did not always defend Malthusian 
8  In 2016, more than 60% of surgeons, dermatologists, obstetricians, pediatricians, psychiatrists and gastroenterologists charge higher 
fees than the Social Security (CNAM, 2017).
positions on the issue of medical demography, and were 
seldom united about it. Whereas the research on the 
sociology of professions has emphasized professional 
closure processes, i.e. quota strategies for a particular 
profession to contain its recruitment and preserve 
its economic and symbolic interests (Larson, 1977; 
Paradeise, 1988), we have demonstrated that it has 
not always been the case. For various reasons, related 
to the position they occupied in the field of medicine, 
doctors have been divided on this subject. In addition, 
the preservation of the economic and symbolic interests 
of physicians did not always imply a strict limitation 
on the number of professionals, including in the 
eyes of the representatives of independent doctors. 
In certain circumstances – which are not uncommon 
considering the last fifty years – they believed the 
opposite, that it was by increasing the number of 
doctors that these interests would be better defended. 
Being more numerous, physicians could meet the 
demands of their patients by maintaining acceptable 
working condition and they would also be more 
powerful. The demographic decline of a professional 
group is not always advantageous for its members: it 
can lead to a narrowing of its jurisdiction, and thus 
to a weakening of its social position, whether it is a 
simple segment within the medical community or the 
profession as a whole.
Moreover, not only the economic and symbolic 
logics to which closure theories attach great 
importance can lead to the opening or closing of 
a group, but they are not the only ones having a 
role in professional demography. First, the logic of 
representation has specific effects on the positions 
of the medical community’s spokespersons. 
For example, the fragmentation of the unions 
of independent doctors in the 1980s and the 
competition between these organizations led them 
to “shoot at the stars” and dramatize the problem 
of medical demography. Second, institutional logic 
has weighed heavily on the way doctors in teaching 
hospitals became apprehensive about the issue of 
medical demography. The dependence of hospital 
and university institutions on the flow of physicians 
in training largely explained the positions taken by 
Saúde Soc. São Paulo, v.27, n.3, p.682-692, 2018  691 
their representatives, both in terms of pedagogy 
and medical demography, over the past fifty years.
From the 1960s to today, medical demography 
has therefore been a matter of struggles within the 
medical profession. These struggles have been largely 
carried out within the state, for which health is a major 
area of public action. With different prerogatives, 
many ministerial departments have been interested, 
with the national health insurance, in medical 
demography since the early 1960s. However, these 
actors have often held opposing views on the policy 
to be led. The internal struggles within the medical 
profession on the issue of medical demography were 
often redoubled by struggles within the state. These 
touched on major social and political issues such as 
access to higher education, the quality of training 
offered to future doctors, the selection of medical 
elites, the operation of hospitals or the medicalization 
of the territory. This explains that although medical 
demography has rarely been a subject of partisan 
confrontation, decisions on this subject have often 
obeyed a strictly political logic involving top political 
leaders. In many cases, these decisions have been 
made less on the basis of an assessment of the 
population’s health needs, which were difficult to 
implement, and more on a pragmatic assessment of 
their short-term political costs or benefits. Decisions 
taken on medical demography have generally obeyed 
the interests of the most powerful segments of the 
medical community. Given that the latter come mainly 
from the richest and most medicalized areas of the 
country, the territorial inequalities in the provision 
of care are likely to continue.
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